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Abstract 
Deaf children from hearing parents show a protracted delay in their performance on standard 
‘theory of mind’ measures that concern their knowledge of false beliefs and other reality 
incongruent mental states. Considerable evidence indicates that children’s early experience of 
adults’ mental state talk predicts their later social cognitive development. However, no 
previous study has analyzed access to conversation about mental states in very young deaf 
children. We compared the conversational input of hearing parents to young deaf and hearing 
children aged 17 to 35 months in the UK and Sweden. Parents of hearing children used far 
more cognitive mental state language with their infants and their conversations were 
characterized by more communicatively effective turn-taking than parents of deaf children.  
These findings indicate that conversational input about mental states to very young deaf 
children differs significantly in those areas of interaction thought to be crucial for later social 
cognitive development and this difference is robust across two different cultures. 
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Mental state language and quality of conversational experience in deaf and hearing children 
 
Exposure to mental state language and interaction with adults are crucial factors in the 
early development of social cognition. Caregivers' attunement to their infants' thoughts and 
feelings, their so-called “mind-mindedness” (Meins et al., 2002), predicts children's 
subsequent social-cognitive and social-emotional development, including performance on 
verbal elicited-response Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. Similarly, Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe 
(2002) and Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006) have reported that mothers’ references to 
mental states directed at children during the second year of life are correlated with their 
children’s later mental state language and emotion understanding. At the same time, the 
connectedness of the conversations between caregivers and infants is important.  Ensor and 
Hughes (2008) coded video transcripts of observations of family interaction for quantity, 
connectedness, and content of mothers’ and children’s talk. Mothers’ connected turns, i.e. 
utterances semantically related to the child’s prior utterance, and mental-state references 
within connected turns with their 2-year-olds were independently associated with measures of 
children’s social-cognitive understanding.  
 Thus early interaction including the mental state content of conversations and the 
quality of the interaction between child and adult are part of the environmental determinants 
of children’s acquisition of social cognition. An extreme illustration of the importance of 
such factors comes from studies of children born deaf but raised by hearing parents who 
themselves are not fluent users of sign language. In the early stages of social cognitive 
development these children, even with early cochlear implants might experience a different 
quality of conversation and interaction during the period their parents adapt to their infant’s 
deafness. Many previous studies have reported that deaf children aged 4 years and above and 
from hearing families who do not use sign language effectively, display a protracted delay in 
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Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning on explicit tests (Courtin & Melot, 2005; Figueras-Costa & 
Harris, 2001; Meristo, Hjelmquist, Surian &  Siegal, in press; Morgan & Kegl, 2006; Pyers & 
Senghas, 2009; Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1999, 2000; Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers,  & 
Hoffmeister, 2007; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). In elicited response methodologies the 
child is explicitly required to respond overtly to a question or prompt about the mental states 
of another person in the test. One issue with such tests used with children with language 
delay is that verbal demands may obscure the child’s underlying cognitive abilities. In recent 
years, spontaneous methodologies  exploiting visual preference measures through eye-
tracking have demonstrated that children as young as 13 months of age display behaviors 
consistent with the hypothesis that they understand false belief in other minds (Kovács, 
Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard, & 
Csibra, 2011; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian & Geraci, 2011; Surian, Caldi, & 
Sperber, 2007) as well as by their pointing gestures and helping behavior (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2010; for a review see 
Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010). Indeed using eye tracking methods with deaf infants, a recent 
study reported that difficulties in understanding false belief exist in 2 year old deaf children 
compared with good performance by same aged hearing children (Meristo et al., 2012).  
The ToM delay may be related to deaf children’s difficulties in conversational 
understanding (Surian, Tedoldi & Siegal, 2010), but it does not extend to other areas of 
cognitive development and does not affect deaf children from deaf families who are exposed 
to a signed language from birth that provides continual access to a language environment 
(Meristo et al., in press; Meristo, Hjelmquist & Morgan, 2012; Remmel, Bettger, & 
Weinberg, 2001; Siegal & Peterson,  2008). So why do deaf infants with hearing parents 
show early signs of delays in social cognitive development? Performance on elicited-
response theory of mind tests in both typically developing hearing and deaf children around 
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4-5 years of age has been seen to be influenced by language development (Milligan, 
Astington, & Dack, 2007; Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers,  & Hoffmeister, 2007) . Language 
skills may be the crucial ingredient for explicit ToM assessments, but as recent studies of 
spontaneous ToM abilities have shown, social-cognitive abilities can be observed several 
months before children are using language. Thus it is possible that more general features of 
early communication play a role in the first stages of social cognitive development rather 
than the child’s syntactic skills.  
Following this argument social cognitive and social emotional understanding in 
typically developing hearing children has been linked to family conversational input about 
mental states (Meins et al., 2002; Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996; Slaughter & 
Peterson, 2012; Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007).  Access to mental state language 
was identified as an important predictor of ToM development in interaction between mothers 
and deaf children aged 4–10 years (Moeller & Schick, 2006). Most of the children in this 
study were at an age where they should have been passing ToM tasks and so it is intriguing to 
know what their conversational experience would have been like when they were much 
younger.  
Examining conversational input and communicative interaction between hearing 
parents and very young children may help to identify the origins of subsequent social 
cognitive delays in deaf children. In the investigation reported here, we examined parental 
mental state language directed at young deaf and hearing children in terms of content and 
interactional quality of the conversational input.  Any differences observed may provide 
insights into the importance of early mental state conversations for children’s social cognitive 
development.  We were also interested in the effects of different language and cultural 
environments on children’s early conversational experience. We examine this, by comparing 
infants and toddlers from the UK and Sweden. Both countries have a strong record in early 
Conversational input to deaf children  6 
identification of deafness and subsequent remediation services and so we will be able to 
evaluate development in children who experience both early and good quality intervention.  
Method 
Participants. The Swedish sample consisted of 10 hearing infants (4 female) and 10 
deaf infants (6 female), all of whom had hearing parents. The mean age of the hearing group 
was 23 months (range: 19 to 28 months). The deaf infants had a mean age of 23 months 
(range: 17 to 26 months). They were healthy and without known additional disabilities such 
as cerebral palsy, autism, mental retardation, or visual impairment.  
In the group of Swedish deaf infants, five used cochlear implants (CI) and five 
hearing amplifications (HA). The CI children had pre-implant hearing levels in the range of 
65 to 120 dB hearing loss. The mean age of implantation was 14 months (range: 12 – 19 
months) and the mean time since implantation was 7 months (range: 1 – 12 months). The HA 
children had hearing levels in the moderately to severely deaf range (between 50 and 80 dB 
hearing loss). The mean age of amplification was 12 months (range: 3 – 26 months) and the 
mean time since first use of HA was 14 months (range: 1 – 21 months). The deaf infants had 
hearing parents who had gained some acquaintance with Swedish Sign Language (SSL) and 
communicated with the infants in spoken Swedish supported with signs. However, none of 
the deaf infants showed proficiency in SSL as measured by an SSL adaptation of the 
MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventories for British Sign Language 
(Woolfe, Herman, Roy, & Woll, 2010). In the deaf group, two infants had two older siblings 
aged 4 to 7 years. In the hearing group, three infants each had one older sibling aged 5 to 13 
years. One infant in each group had a 2-month-old younger sibling. Five other infants were 
initially tested and excluded because they did not cooperate during the visit (1 deaf and 4 
hearing children). Children’s language scores were measured as extremely poor using the 
Reynell Developmental Language Scales (Reynell, 1977). 
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The UK sample consisted of 20 deaf children (10 female) and 9 hearing children (5 
female).  The deaf children had a mean age at the time of first testing visit of 28 months 
(range: 22 months to 35 months) and the hearing children had a mean age of 28 months 
(range: 20 months to 35 months). The British sample was significantly older than the 
Swedish one (Deaf: t(28)=3.34, p=.002; Hearing: t(17)=2.06, p=.055). They were healthy and 
without known additional disabilities such as autism, mental retardation, or visual 
impairment.  
Of the 20 deaf children, 16 had CIs and four HAs at the time of testing. The CI 
children had pre-implant hearing levels in the range of 80 to >140 dB of hearing loss. The 
mean age of implantation was 18 months (range: 12 – 29 months), and the mean time since 
implantation was 11 months (range: 1 – 19 months). The HA children had hearing levels in 
the moderately to severely deaf range (between 50 and 80 dB of hearing loss). The mean age 
of amplification was 4 months (range: 1–10 months) and the mean time since first use of HA 
was 24 months (range: 12 – 31 months).    All deaf children had hearing parents who had 
minimal familiarity with British Sign Language (BSL). The children’s language scores were 
assessed using the BSL and English MacArthur Bates CDI (Woolfe et al, 2010) with deaf 
children scoring extremely low. Three other children were excluded: two children did not 
cooperate during the first testing visit and one child who had cerebral palsy.  
  In the hearing group recruited from preschools located in the London area, two 
children had younger siblings (aged 2–9 months), one of whom also had an older sibling (8 
years) whereas in the deaf group, 11 had 1–3 older siblings aged 4 to 9 years and four had 
one younger sibling each aged 5 to 12 months.  
 
Procedure. The City University London Ethical Review Board and the Regional 
Swedish Government Ethical Review Board approved the procedure. The parents in both 
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Sweden and the UK were given 10 pictures portraying emotionally charged or mentalistic 
situations such as a father scolding his son and a boy clapping his hands after building a 
tower of blocks (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). In a video-recorded session, each parent 
was asked to look at the pictures together and talk (using any form of spoken, signed or 
gestural communication they wished) with their child about what they saw.  
Mental state terms. Using the method devised by Ensor and Hughes (2008), parents’ 
language use was analyzed for mental state categories and the quality of conversational turns.  
Categories included all references to cognitive terms (e.g. “think” or “know”), emotions (e.g. 
“happy”, “pleased”, “sad”, “worried” or “bored”), and desires (e.g. “want”, “like”, “don’t 
like” or “hope”).  
Conversational quality. Each conversational turn, defined as the utterances of one 
speaker bounded by another speaker’s utterances, in the parent-child conversation was 
classified as connected, initiated, failed or unclear. Connected turns were defined as all 
utterances which were semantically related to the other interlocutor’s previous turn. A turn 
was categorized as initiated when the speaker initiated a new topic that was unrelated to the 
previous turn and successful in eliciting a semantically related response from the other. 
Failed turns were coded as turns that were directed to the other interlocutor but failed to elicit 
a semantically related response. Utterances that were not understandable were classified as 
unclear. An additional category from Hughes and Ensor, conflictual turns, was excluded 
since these were infrequent and could be included as one of the other four categories.  
For interrater reliability, two independent coders transcribed 10% of the parental 
conversations directed at the deaf and hearing groups. Cohen’s kappa was κ = 1.0 for the 
mental state categories involving cognitions, desires, and emotions, and κ = .97 for the 
quality of conversational turns.  
Results 
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Scores for parental mental state talk and turn-taking in the Swedish and British 
samples are shown in Table 1 (I THINK IT WOULD BE BETTER  TO USE A FIGURE, in 
substituion or addition, GIVEN THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION INCLUDED IN THE 
TABLE). To control for parents’ verbosity, we calculated proportions of each type of 
reference in relation to total amount of words used by the parents. The British hearing 
group’s mean (42.22) was much higher than that of the Swedish hearing group’s mean 
(16.60) (t(17)=2.59; p=.019). This difference presumably reflects cultural differences as 
well age differences between the two cultures.  
------------------------- 
         Table 1 about here 
------------------------- 
Mental state language. The mean numbers of minutes devoted to conversations about 
the pictures by the parents of deaf and hearing children respectively were 8.76 (SD = 5.26) 
and 7.85 (SD = 3.57) in Sweden and 7.24 (SD = 3.69) and 7.34 (SD = 3.61) in the UK.  These 
times were not significantly different for children tested at either location, t(18) = .454, p > 
.655, η2 = .01 and, t(27) = .066, p > .948, η2 = .01 (see Table 1).  The number of words used 
by the parents during the task was 728 for the deaf and 502 for the hearing group in Sweden 
(t(18) = 1.20, p > .244, η2 = .07), and 498 for the deaf and 711 for the hearing group in the 
UK (t(27) = 1.89, p > .069, η2 = .12).  
For each sample, a 2 (group: deaf children vs. hearing children) X 3 (content: 
cognitive vs. desire vs. emotion references) ANOVA was conducted to examine differences 
in mental state language among the groups. There are developmental differences between 
different types of mental state concepts with desire preceding emotion and lastly beliefs 
(Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012). For the Swedish infants, there was a main effect for 
content, F(2, 36) = 7.15, p < .002, ηp2 = .28, and a significant group X content interaction 
effect, F(2, 36) = 3.75, p < .033, ηp2 = .17.  Parents of hearing infants referred to cognitions 
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more often than did those of deaf infants, t(18) = 2.19, p < .042, η2 = .21. There were no 
differences between the groups in references to desires (t(18) = 0.67, p > .513, η2 = .02) or 
emotions (t(18) = 0.82, p > .423, η2 = .04).  
Similarly, for the British sample, there were a significant main effect for content, F(2, 
54) = 8.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, and a significant group X content interaction effect, F(2, 54) = 
4.67, p < .013, ηp2 = .15. Parents of hearing children again referred to cognitions more often 
than those of deaf infants, t(27) = 3.86, p < .001, η2 = .36. There were no differences between 
the groups in references to desires (t(27) = 0.48, p > .632, η2 = .01) or emotions (t(27) = 0.07, 
p > .949, η2 = .001)  (see Figure 1).  Within-group comparisons are given in supporting 
information. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
(Figure illustrating in a bar-graph the frequency of the three types mental state terms 
in the four groups) 
Within-group analyses for the use of mental state language. For the Swedish sample, 
parents of hearing infants referred to cognitions significantly more often than to desires, t(9) 
= 3.32, p < .009, η2 = .55. Although there was also a trend towards using more cognitive 
references than emotions, t(9) = 2.19, p = .056, η2 = .35, the difference in the use of desire 
and emotion references was not significant, t(9) = 1.02, p > .333, η2 = .10. By contrast, 
parents of deaf infants used references to cognitions and emotions equally, t(9) = .63, p > 
.547, η2 = .04, but referred less often to desires than both cognitions t(9) = 2.32, p < .045, η2 = 
.37, and emotions t(9) = 2.82, p < .020, η2 = .47. There was a significant correlation between 
parents’ proportional references to cognitions and children’s age in the hearing group, r = 
.55, p < .05 (one-tailed). In the deaf group, there were no significant correlations between age 
and any of the measures of parents’ references.  For the British hearing sample, parents again 
referred to cognitions significantly more often than to desires, t(8) = 4.14, p < .003, η2 = .68; 
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and emotions, t(8) = 4.53, p < .002, η2 = .72. There were no significant differences in the deaf 
group in the usage of different mental state verbs (cognition vs. desire - t(19) = .47, p > .646, 
η2 = .01; cognition vs. emotion t(19) = 1.35, p > .192, η2 = .09; desire vs. emotion t(19) = .47, 
p > .642, η2 = .01). The correlation between references to cognitions and children’s age in the 
hearing group was r = .81, p < .01 (two-tailed), but there were no significant correlations in 
the deaf group between any of the measures of parents’ references and children’s age. 
Turn-taking. To examine the quality of turn-taking in conversation, a 2 (group: deaf 
vs. hearing) X 3 (conversational turns: connected vs. initiated vs. failed) ANOVA was carried 
out for each sample on the proportions of each turn type in relation to the total amount of 
turns. For the Swedish dyads, there was a significant main effect for conversational turns 
(F(2, 36) = 18.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .51) as well as a significant group X conversational turns 
interaction effect F(2, 36) = 8.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .33. Parent-hearing infant dyads had more 
connected (t(18) = 2.96, p < .008, η2 = .33) and initiated (t(18) = 2.77, p < .013, η2 = .30) 
turns than did parent-deaf infant dyads, while there were more failed turns among parent-deaf 
infant dyads than among parent-hearing infant dyads (t(18) = 3.02, p < .007, η2 = .34). For 
parent-hearing infant dyads, turns were significantly more likely to be connected than 
initiated, t(9) = 5.73, p < .001, η2 = .78; but equally likely to be connected or failed t(9) = .26, 
p > .805, η2 = .01; and initiated or failed t(9) = 1.87, p > .094, η2 = .28. For parent-deaf infant 
dyads, turns were more likely to be failed than connected, t(9) = 5.01, p < .001, η2 = .74; or 
initiated, t(9) = 8.39, p < .001, η2 = .89, and also significantly more connected than initiated, 
t(9) = 3.52, p < .007, η2 = .58. For parent-deaf infant dyads, children’s age was significantly 
related to the proportion of connected turns, r = .72, p < .05; initiated turns, r = .72, p < .05; 
and failed turns, r = -.72, p < .05. There were no correlations for the parent-hearing infant 
dyads between age and any of the conversational quality measures. 
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Similarly, for the British sample, the main effect for quality of turns was significant: 
F(2, 54) = 44.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .62) and well as the group X quality interaction effect, F(2, 
54) = 4.12, p < .022, ηp2 = .13.  The parent-hearing child dyads produced significantly more 
connected turns than did the parent-deaf child dyads, t(27) = 2.51, p < .019, η2 = .19. There 
were no significant differences in initiated (t(27) = 1.42, p > .166, η2 = .07) or failed turns  
(t(27) = 0.45, p > .657, η2 = .01). Among parent-hearing child dyads, turns were significantly 
more likely to be connected than initiated, t(8) = 2.86, p < .021, η2 = .51; more likely to be 
connected than failed t(8) = 7.63, p < .001, η2 = .88; and more likely to be initiated than failed 
t(8) = 3.88, p < .005, η2 = .65. For the parent-deaf child dyads, turns were more likely to be 
connected than failed, t(19) = 10.36, p < .001, η2 = .85; and more likely to be initiated than 
failed, t(19) = 7.28, p < .001, η2 = .74. There were no differences in the amount of connected 
and initiated turns for the parent-deaf child dyads, t(19) = 1.01, p > .324, η2 = .05. For parent-
hearing child dyads, children’s age was significantly positively related to the proportion of 
connected turns, r = .74, p < .05; and negatively related to the amount of initiated turns, r = -
.68, p < .05. There were no correlations for the parent-deaf child dyads between the 
children’s age and any of the conversational quality measures. While the UK deaf group are 
older than the Swedish deaf group we do not see any differences in the quality or content of 
the conversation addressed to these children by their hearing mothers.  
Discussion 
Parents of deaf infants and young children used significantly less cognitive mental 
state language and their conversations were characterized by less communicatively effective 
turn-taking compared to parents of hearing infants and children. By using exactly the same 
methodology employed in previous research with hearing children, we were able to pinpoint 
the possible predictors of child ToM development in the parents input (Ruffman, Slade & 
Crowe, 2002).  These findings are the first such demonstration of differences in social-
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cognitive related interaction with 2 year old deaf children. The impact of childhood deafness 
on parent-child interaction in those areas thought to be crucial for future social-cognitive 
development, are apparent early in life. The notion that deaf children of hearing parents 
experience reduced access to conversations about the mind (Siegal & Peterson, 2000) is thus 
borne out in our data - conversations are simpler and less connected. The results from the 
Swedish and British samples were very similar providing converging cross-cultural evidence 
for differences between parents of deaf and hearing infants and toddlers in their use of mental 
state language and their involvement in communicatively effective turn-taking. We have 
shown that the pattern of mind-minded talk and connectedness is the same for both Swedish 
and somewhat older British groups. 
While similar findings have been reported for older deaf children who use sign 
language (Moeller & Schick, 2006) the current study includes children who are being raised 
in mostly spoken language environments. Parents used very few signs from BSL and SSL. 
Thus a difficulty in using sign language by hearing parents can be mostly ruled out. Parents 
are using their native spoken languages but still produce a restricted amount of mental state 
language. Rather than seeing socio-cognitive development as being a result of the child’s 
linguistic skills, it is the child and adults’ skills in communicating with each other which 
triggers parents to employ more sophisticated mental state language in their conversations 
(Meristo, Hjelmquist, & Morgan, 2012). Deaf children who exhibit delayed language 
development do not communicate effectively and thus do not stimulate the increase in 
sophistication of the parent’s mental state input.  
While typically developing infants are not explicitly taught ToM abilities, they do 
receive sufficient relevant input. In this way through a continual process of communicative 
exchanges where the child and adult engage in a culturally appropriate set of conversation 
turns, the processes underpinning  belief attribution can be practiced and automatized.  We do 
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not maintain that hearing infants have a grasp of the meaning of terms for mental states but 
that, even at a very early age, they can benefit from the pragmatic context of verbal and 
gestural communication in joint attention when these terms are employed. The deaf group 
have cochlear implants meaning they can access some sound, yet their difficulties in 
interaction, that clearly come out of the conversation data for both the British and Swedish 
samples, suggest that conversational input received from  the hearing parent, new to the 
experience of interacting with a deaf infant, is impoverished.  
It could be said that the parents in our sample with deaf children are interacting 
entirely appropriately, as they are matching their mind minded talk for the language skills 
their offspring have developed. They did make references to emotions and desires but not to 
epistemic mental states such as beliefs. This means that parents may have adapted their 
language by using simplified conversations that are more appropriate for young children  
(Peterson, Wellman & Slaughter, 2012). The characteristics of the deaf child drive the 
conversation in that the words, gestures, and homesigns used by hearing parents in an effort 
to communicate on a level with their deaf infants and children can make effective reference 
to concrete and observable concepts but encounter severe obstacles with abstract notions such 
as beliefs. If this were the only difference in our data we might predict that as the child’s 
language develops, the parents would eventually begin to use more mental state language, as 
observed in older deaf children’s interactions (Moeller & Schick, 2006).  However what is 
potentially more problematic is the reduced amount of connected conversation in the deaf 
child-hearing mother dyads. Ensor & Hughes (2008) reported strong predictors of social-
cognitive development come from the amount of connected conversation children experience. 
It is striking that the deaf children in our study have very little exposure to this factor.  These 
children are not experiencing shared talk about joint references and thus having less time in a 
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‘culture of minds’ (Nelson, 2005). Moreover, unlike hearing infants (Akhtar, 2005), deaf 
infants cannot easily learn from overhearing conversations of others.  
Only 2–5% of the total utterances in our hearing samples concerned references to 
cognitive mental states.  This suggests that increasing talk about mental states to deaf 
children only by a small amount could make a lot of difference. However increasing language 
input may not be enough. The parents of the deaf children were also dealing with a child who 
might need a more sequential processing of input when directing attention to an object or 
picture. This is relevant for planned social-cognitive interventions. Future early interventions 
for families with deaf children should include training in conversation about the mind as well 
as regular speech and language therapy to include strategies for managing communication. 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations for measures of parental mental state talk and turn-taking (with percentages in parentheses)  * p < .05; ** p < .01 
                                                                          Swedish sample                                                                                            British sample 
 Deaf (N=10) Hearing (N=10)  Deaf (N=20) Hearing (N=9)  
Measure M SD M SD t M SD M SD t 
 
















27.56 5.57 .32 
Time (minutes) 8.76 5.26 7.85 3.57 .45 7.24 3.69 7.34 3.61 .07 
Total utterances (words) 728.30 509.38 501.90 306.91 1.20 497.95 312.59 711.00 181.48 1.89 
Total mental state words 14.00 (2.26) 9.01 (1.02) 16.60 (3.15) 12.61 (1.56) 1.52 14.05 (3.30) 12.51 (2.70) 42.22 (5.55) 28.36 (2.48) 2.12* 
Cognitive references 5.70 (0.83) 5.31 (0.72) 11.30 (1.96) 9.65 (1.46) 2.19* 8.10 (1.44) 9.55 (1.37) 31.67 (4.08) 24.96 (2.31) 3.86** 
Desire references 2.60 (0.33) 2.50 (0.36) 1.80 (0.44) 1.32 (0.35) .67 3.65 (1.10) 4.88 (2.61) 4.78 (0.67) 3.99 (0.59) .48 
Emotion references 5.70 (1.05) 3.97 (0.73) 3.60 (0.77) 3.50 (0.79) .82 2.30 (0.76) 3.56 (1.59) 5.78 (0.79) 2.86 (0.26) .07 
Total number of turns 148.80 133.23 161.70 80.42 .26 58.05 36.85 81.89 57.91 1.35 
Mean length of turns  10.08 3.46 7.62 4.14 1.44 12.80 19.72 13.11 10.22 .04 
Connected turns 37.90 (19.47) 56.25 (14.00) 75.50 (43.00) 46.34 (20.84) 2.96** 29.75 (44.93) 23.82 (18.99) 63.56 (65.88) 56.19 (24.66) 2.51* 
Initiated turns 15.80 (9.07) 19.89 (4.75) 30.50 (17.60) 18.77 (8.50) 2.77* 16.55 (36.23) 7.72 (20.47) 13.56 (24.82) 3.84 (18.72) 1.42 
Failed turns 95.10 (71.31) 73.90 (18.73) 55.40 (39.06) 32.80 (28.15) 3.02** 1.30 (1.56) 3.21 (3.27) 0.44 (1.02) 0.88 (2.18) 0.45 
Unclear 0.50 (0.14) 1.27 (0.36) 0.40 (0.34) 0.97 (0.87) .69 10.75 (18.81) 8.16 (12.11) 4.33 (8.28) 3.46 (6.84) 2.42* 
